The flow of the code is roughly as follows:
user clicks button on webauthn page
js sends GET request
python reads GET request, sets up login challenge
python returns login challenge in response
js reads GET response, passes login challenge to browser
browser asks user to touch yubikey
browser returns yubikey challenge response data to js
js sends POST request with yubikey challenge response data
python reads yubikey challenge and compares with users creds from db
if its a match, python signs user in
The login challenge is a PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions: [1]
The browser function we call is navigator.credentials.get(): [2]
The response to the challenge from the browser is a PublicKeyCredential: [3]
The python server does all the work setting those up and tearing them
back down again (and checking them against the values we have stored in
the database), but we need to do work to convert them to-and-from CBOR.
[1] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions
[2] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/CredentialsContainer/get
[3] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/PublicKeyCredential
if user has `webauthn_auth` as their auth type, then redirect them to an
interstitial that prompts them to click on a button which right now just
logs to the JS console, but in a future commit will open up the webauthn
browser prompt
content is unsurprisingly not final.
without the need for verification.
This is for when the email takes too long to arrive and the service
users cannot update it as a result.
A more streamlined solution has been proposed where we could send
a link in the verification email to the users and clicking that
link would add/update reply-email-to address.
That would require a bit more work so right now I am proposing this
as a quick stop gap so that we don't have to go to the database
manually to add the reply-to email address.
This closes a security loophole, where the auth type of a Platform
Admin could be unwittingly changed when they accept an invite, or
by an admin of a service they are a member of.
when getting a list of security keys
Also test separately that we are correctly choosing key out of list
of security keys. Previously we have done it as a part
of testing pages where where we were calling API to get a list
of keys, but then choosing one of those keys based on id.
Also remove redundant second test credential after PR review
Also remove redundant return value from mocks in update name tests
When we are unable to delete security key because it's the last
one for that user, API throws an error. Here we catch that error
and display useful message to the user.
Use security key instead of webauthn credential
in user facing message - for consistency and readability.
We use security key term in user facing stuff and webauthn
credential in the code.
Previously we could only select a provider when using the test
channel, but this is also required for others channels when we
do tests on the production network with individual MNOs.
In order to reduce duplication and improve consistency, I've reused
the new broadcast_service_name_tag macro to show the setting.
At the moment if you’re invited to a live broadcast service you get the
training mode tour. This is misleading, and could make people think they
weren’t in danger of sending a real alert.
This commit adds a short, 2 step tour for users invited to a live
broadcast service.
Because we were redirecting in all cases the error message wasn’t being
shown.
This commit changes the endpoint to respond with content (including an
error message) if the `POST` is not successful.
We want people to be really sure before sending a live broadcast, not
just clicking through the green buttons.
This commit adds a checkbox which explains exactly the consequences of
what they’re about to do, tailored to the channel they’re on, and the
area chosen by the person creating the alert.
Previously we would raise a 500 error in a variety of cases:
- If a second key was being registered simultaneously (e.g. in a
separate tab), which means the registration state could be missing
after the first registration completes. That smells like an attack.
- If the server-side verification failed e.g. origin verification,
challenge verification, etc. The library seems to use 'ValueError'
for all such errors [1] (after auditing its 'raise' statements, and
excluding AttestationError [2], since we're not doing that).
- If a key is used that attempts to sign with an unsupported
algorithm. This would normally raise a NotImplemented error as part
of verifying attestation [3], but we don't do that, so we need to
verify the algorithm is supported by the library manually.
This adds error handling to return a 400 response and error message
in these cases, since the error is not unexpected (i.e. not a 500).
A 400 seems more appropriate than a 403, since in many cases it's
not clear if the request data is valid.
I've used CBOR for the transport encoding, to match the successful
request / response encoding. Note that the ordering of then/catch
matters in JS - we don't want to catch our own throws!
[1]: 142587b3e6/fido2/server.py (L255)
[2]: c42d9628a4/fido2/attestation/base.py (L39)
[3]: c42d9628a4/fido2/cose.py (L92)
This passes existing credentials in the server response, to allow
the browser to prevent re-registering the same key for the same
user. Registering the same key multiple times doesn't seem to be
an issue technically; the user has likely got their keys mixed up.
- Chrome says "you don't need to register it again".
- Safari exits with an InvalidStateError.
- Firefox exits with a DOMException.
This adds Yubico's FIDO2 library and two APIs for working with the
"navigator.credentials.create()" function in JavaScript. The GET
API uses the library to generate options for the "create()" function,
and the POST API decodes and verifies the resulting credential. While
the options and response are dict-like, CBOR is necessary to encode
some of the byte-level values, which can't be represented in JSON.
Much of the code here is based on the Yubico library example [1][2].
Implementation notes:
- There are definitely better ways to alert the user about failure, but
window.alert() will do for the time being. Using location.reload() is
also a bit jarring if the page scrolls, but not a major issue.
- Ideally we would use window.fetch() to do AJAX calls, but we don't
have a polyfill for this, and we use $.ajax() elsewhere [3]. We need
to do a few weird tricks [6] to stop jQuery trashing the data.
- The FIDO2 server doesn't serve web requests; it's just a "server" in
the sense of WebAuthn terminology. It lives in its own module, since it
needs to be initialised with the app / config.
- $.ajax returns a promise-like object. Although we've used ".fail()"
elsewhere [3], I couldn't find a stub object that supports it, so I've
gone for ".catch()", and used a Promise stub object in tests.
- WebAuthn only works over HTTPS, but there's an exception for "localhost"
[4]. However, the library is a bit too strict [5], so we have to disable
origin verification to avoid needing HTTPS for dev work.
[1]: c42d9628a4/examples/server/server.py
[2]: c42d9628a4/examples/server/static/register.html
[3]: 91453d3639/app/assets/javascripts/updateContent.js (L33)
[4]: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/55971593/navigator-credentials-is-null-on-local-server
[5]: c42d9628a4/fido2/rpid.py (L69)
[6]: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/12394622/does-jquery-ajax-or-load-allow-for-responsetype-arraybuffer
When showing what auth type user uses to sign in, add a text
for users with webauthn.
On password change or sign in, throw not implemented error
if user uses webauthn auth.
Only the test channel has the option to isolate messages to one network.
This commits makes the choices less confusing by only showing the
network choice to those who have selected the test channel.
We have been asked to support the government channel so that:
- it can be tested
- the option to use it is available for the most severe of emergencies,
where the public’s choice to opt-out is outweighed by the widespread
risk to life
It feels quite dangerous that it’s just one click to make an emergency
alerts service live.
This commit adds a confirmation step which explains the consequences of
what you’re about to do.
This adds a new platform admin settings row, leading a page which
shows any existing keys and allows a new one to be registered. Until
the APIs for this are implemented, the user API client just returns
some stubbed data for manual testing.
This also includes a basic JavaScript module to do the main work of
registering a new authenticator, to be implemented in the next commits.
Some more minor notes:
- Setting the headings in the mapping_table is necessary to get the
horizontal rule along the top (to match the design).
- Setting caption to False in the mapping_table is necessary to stop
an extra margin appearing at the top.
The current_service.allowed_broadcast_provider is now always "all" or
one of the four providers, which means we can simply the code by not
checking if it is None.
Until all the data is updated to always be "all", we have to handle the
case of provider_restriction being set to None or "all" (which mean the
same thing).
The code can be tidied up once the broadcast provider_restriction is never None.
We're replacing the value of None with the value of all. API has been
updated to accept both values
(1767535def)
so this change starts sending notifications-api the value of "all".
This is the first step in making the UI easier for setting the
options for a broadcast service. Here we remove the options for
"Training mode" test channels. When we create a broadcast message for a trail mode service it is marked as stubbed and does not create a broadcast event that is sent to a provider.
The label for the form and setting page have been updated to reflect the
change.
Do not allow platform admins to:
- create broadcasts
- approve broadcasts
- reject broadcasts
that is, unless they have a send_messages permission
for a given service.
This is so platform admins have the minimum permissions necessary
to cancel a broadcast that might have been sent out accidentally.
How this happens: a user starts to send a letter job, then in another tab starts a SMS
or email job, the sender_id is set in the session. Then the user goes
back to the letter job tab and creates the job. The sender_id is set in
the metadata of the csv file, and causes an exception when trying to persist
the letter notification.
This PR adds a check to ensure the sender_id is not set for letter jobs.
This will catch a small use case where the user has multiple tabs open
and has started sending an SMS or email job, then tries to send a letter
job.
For someone who has retrieved a template ID from their system the only
way to find it in Notify is:
- hack the URL
- click through every template, visually inspecting the ID shown on the
page until you find the right one
Neither of these is ideal.
This commit adds searching by ID, for those services who have an API
integration. This means we don’t need to confuse teams who aren’t using
the API by talking about IDs.
This is similar to how we let these teams search for notifications by
reference[1]
1. https://github.com/alphagov/notifications-admin/pull/3223/files
> Rule of three ("Three strikes and you refactor") is a code refactoring
> rule of thumb to decide when similar pieces of code should be
> refactored to avoid duplication. It states that two instances of
> similar code don't require refactoring, but when similar code is used
> three times, it should be extracted into a new procedure
– https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_three_(computer_programming)
