This changeset pulls in all of the notification_utils code directly into the admin and removes it as an external dependency. We are doing this to cut down on operational maintenance of the project and will begin removing parts of it no longer needed for the admin.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Costino <carlo.costino@gsa.gov>
This changeset removes webauthn from the Notify.gov admin app. We are not using webauthn at all in our implementation and will be looking at an entirely different authentication system in the near future.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Costino <carlo.costino@gsa.gov>
Sometimes users ask us to delete their mobile numbers for them.
If those users are on email auth, they should be able to
delete their number themselves.
This will save them writing a support ticket and save us
going into the database.
This allows us to roll out the feature to other users. Note that
the flag is also "True" if the user has "webauthn_auth" as their
auth type, so this is compatible with the more fine-grained check
we have on the authentication parts of the feature. We could do a
more explicit "can_use_webauthn or webauthn_auth" check here, but
the idea is that we'll be able to get rid of this flag eventually,
so I've optimised for brevity instead.
I've modified a couple of the unhappy-path tests to make it more
explicit that the flag is false, since it can be true for Platform
Admins and "normal users" alike.
This saves a bit of repetition, and lets us attach other methods to the
collection, rather than having multiple methods on the user object
prefixed with the same name, or random functions floating about.
when getting a list of security keys
Also test separately that we are correctly choosing key out of list
of security keys. Previously we have done it as a part
of testing pages where where we were calling API to get a list
of keys, but then choosing one of those keys based on id.
Also remove redundant second test credential after PR review
Also remove redundant return value from mocks in update name tests
When we are unable to delete security key because it's the last
one for that user, API throws an error. Here we catch that error
and display useful message to the user.
Use security key instead of webauthn credential
in user facing message - for consistency and readability.
We use security key term in user facing stuff and webauthn
credential in the code.
This adds a new platform admin settings row, leading a page which
shows any existing keys and allows a new one to be registered. Until
the APIs for this are implemented, the user API client just returns
some stubbed data for manual testing.
This also includes a basic JavaScript module to do the main work of
registering a new authenticator, to be implemented in the next commits.
Some more minor notes:
- Setting the headings in the mapping_table is necessary to get the
horizontal rule along the top (to match the design).
- Setting caption to False in the mapping_table is necessary to stop
an extra margin appearing at the top.
Rather than force us to write the decorators in a specific order let’s
just have one decorator call the other. This should make fewer lines of
code, and fewer annoying test failures. It also means that the same way
of raising a `401` (through the `current_app` method) is used
everywhere.
so that platform admins (us) can view pages as regular users do easily.
Simply adds a flag in the session cookie that overrides the actual
platform admin flag on the user model if set. This way it's safe, since
this only downgrades existing functionality, so if someone managed to
alter it they could only get less permissions, not more.
You can change this value from the user profile page if either:
* you're a platform admin
* the flag is set (to any value) on the cookie.
This slightly weird check means that we don't check the underlying
`user._platform_admin` flag anywhere in the code, even when toggling
the suppression.
The data flow of other bits of our application looks like this:
```
API (returns JSON)
⬇
API client (returns a built in type, usually `dict`)
⬇
Model (returns an instance, eg of type `Service`)
⬇
View (returns HTML)
```
The user API client was architected weirdly, in that it returned a model
directly, like this:
```
API (returns JSON)
⬇
API client (returns a model, of type `User`, `InvitedUser`, etc)
⬇
View (returns HTML)
```
This mixing of different layers of the application is bad because it
makes it hard to write model code that doesn’t have circular
dependencies. As our application gets more complicated we will be
relying more on models to manage this complexity, so we should make it
easy, not hard to write them.
It also means that most of our mocking was of the User model, not just
the underlying JSON. So it would have been easy to introduce subtle bugs
to the user model, because it wasn’t being comprehensively tested. A lot
of the changed lines of code in this commit mean changing the tests to
mock only the JSON, which means that the model layer gets implicitly
tested.
For those reasons this commit changes the user API client to return
JSON, not an instance of `User` or other models.
Done using isort[1], with the following command:
```
isort -rc ./app ./tests
```
Adds linting to the `run_tests.sh` script to stop badly-sorted imports
getting re-introduced.
Chosen style is ‘Vertical Hanging Indent’ with trailing commas, because
I think it gives the cleanest diffs, eg:
```
from third_party import (
lib1,
lib2,
lib3,
lib4,
)
```
1. https://pypi.python.org/pypi/isort
* if the service issuing the invite does not have permission to edit
auth types, don't let them do anything. This will stop them turning
existing email_auth users back to sms auth
* if the user hasn't got a mobile number, but the invite is for sms
login, don't do anything either. They won't have a phone number if
they signed up via an email_auth invite previously.
in these cases, we accept the invite and add the user to the service
as normal, however, just don't update the user's auth type.
specifically, the 2FA page when you first create an account is different to the login 2FA page
and also the 2FA page when you change your phone number is different as well
This PR changes the flow to change an email address.
Once the user enter their password, they are told "Check your email".
An email has been sent to them containing a link to notify which contains an encrypted token.
The encrypted token contains the user id and new email address. Once the link is clicked the user's email address is updated to the new email address.
They are redirected to the /user-profile page.
Also in this commit is an update from flask.ext.login to flask_login.
- it tried to send a verify code which no longer is applicable
- one stage of process removed and tests update properly
Flow is:
- Change email
- Confirm with password
- Done
