_complete_webauthn_authentication -> _verify_webauthn_authentication
This function just does verification of the actual auth process -
checking the challenge is correct, the signature matches the public key
we have stored in our database, etc.
verify_webauthn_login -> _complete_webauthn_login_attempt
This function doesn't do any actual verification, we've already verified
the user is who they say they are (or not), it's about marking the
attempt, either unsuccessful (we bump the failed_login_count in the db)
or successful (we set the logged_in_at and current_session_id in the
db).
This change also informs changes to the names of methods on the user
model and in user_api_client.
flashes are consumed by the jinja template calling get_flashed_messages
in flash_messages.html.
When you call `abort(403)` the 403 error page is rendered, with the
flashed message on it. However, the webauthn endpoints just return that
page to the ajax `fetch`, which ignores the response and just reloads
the page.
Instead of calling abort, we can just return an empty response body and
the 403 error code, so that the flashed messages stay in the session and
will be rendered when the `GET /two-factor-webauthn` request happens
after the js reloads the page.
notably i had to change `window.location = foo` to
`window.location.assign` so that i could have something to spy on with
jest. mocking sucks. Otherwise this is pretty similar to the
registerSecurityKey.test.js file.
rather than having a gross if/else, we can define separately. This means
we can separate the asserts and test setups for the first fetch (get)
and the second fetch (post), which means we can arrange all the mocks in
the order they're called in the function, significantly enhancing
legibility of the tests
the js fetch function is really not designed to work with 302s. when it
receives a 302, it automatically follows it and fetches the next page.
This is awkward because I don't want js to do all this in ajax, I want
the browser to get the new URL so it can load the page.
A better approach is to view the admin endpoint as a more pure API: the
js sends a request for authentication to the admin app, and the admin
app responds with a 200 indicating success, and then a payload of
relevant data with that.
The relevant data in this case is "Which URL should I redirect to", it
might be the user's list of services page, or it might be a page telling
them that their email needs revalidating.
this doesn't include timeouts or other errors on the browser side - the
main thing this catches is if the token doesn't belong to the user.
However I'm not entirely clear if that's something that will be caught
at this point, or if the browser would reject that key as it's not in
the credentials passed in to the begin_authentication process.
the js `fetch` function will follow redirects blindly and return you the
final 200 response. when there's an error, we don't want to go anywhere,
and we want to use the flask `flash` functionality to pop up an error
page (the likely reason for seeing this is using a yubikey that isn't
associated with your user). using `flash` and then
`window.location.reload()` handles this fine.
However, when the user does log in succesfully we need to properly log
them in - this includes:
* checking their account isn't over the max login count
* resetting failed login count to 0 if not
* setting a new session id in the database (so other browser windows are
logged out)
* checking if they need to revalidate their email access (every 90 days)
* clearing old user out of the cache
This code all happens in the ajax function rather than being in a
separate redirect, so that you can't just navigate to the login flow. I
wasn't able to unit test that function due how it uses the session and
other flask globals, so moved the auth into its own function so it's
easy to stub out all that CBOR nonsense.
TODO: We still need to pass any `next` URLs through the chain from login
page all the way through the javascript AJAX calls and redirects to the
log_in_user function
this is a bit complex, but essentially we're using the test variables
defined in the duolabs py_webauthn library [1]. We're already using
their test variables in tests/app/models/test_webauthn_credential.py and
in the webauthn_credential fixture in conftest.py. By using sample
signature, authenticatordata and clientdatajson from the same key we can
test that the library correctly verifies the signed challenge matches
the original.
We needed to transform some of this data as the yubico/fido2 library we
use has a slightly different way of formatting the fields for the
request body, which is why we're doing things like base64 decoding and
converting from hex to bytes in the post data.
The pytest fixture has changed - before it was incomplete/corrupted and
would error when trying to verify the signature. We took the
credential_data from the pytest fixture, converted it to an
AttestedCredentialData using WebauthnCredential.to_credential_data,
modified the public_key private dictionary to add `public_key[-1]: 1`,
and then called `AttestedCredentialData.create` to re-CBOR-encode the
blob.
The `-1: 1` is the numeric ID of the "SECP256R1" elliptic curve
algorithm. The py_webauthn library forces this particular algorithm,
which differs from the sample creds we took from the fido2 lib tests,
which is why we've had to update our data.
[1] https://github.com/duo-labs/py_webauthn/blob/master/tests/test_webauthn.py#L13-L32
The flow of the code is roughly as follows:
user clicks button on webauthn page
js sends GET request
python reads GET request, sets up login challenge
python returns login challenge in response
js reads GET response, passes login challenge to browser
browser asks user to touch yubikey
browser returns yubikey challenge response data to js
js sends POST request with yubikey challenge response data
python reads yubikey challenge and compares with users creds from db
if its a match, python signs user in
The login challenge is a PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions: [1]
The browser function we call is navigator.credentials.get(): [2]
The response to the challenge from the browser is a PublicKeyCredential: [3]
The python server does all the work setting those up and tearing them
back down again (and checking them against the values we have stored in
the database), but we need to do work to convert them to-and-from CBOR.
[1] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions
[2] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/CredentialsContainer/get
[3] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/PublicKeyCredential
if user has `webauthn_auth` as their auth type, then redirect them to an
interstitial that prompts them to click on a button which right now just
logs to the JS console, but in a future commit will open up the webauthn
browser prompt
content is unsurprisingly not final.
without the need for verification.
This is for when the email takes too long to arrive and the service
users cannot update it as a result.
A more streamlined solution has been proposed where we could send
a link in the verification email to the users and clicking that
link would add/update reply-email-to address.
That would require a bit more work so right now I am proposing this
as a quick stop gap so that we don't have to go to the database
manually to add the reply-to email address.
We can use the `optional_text_field` macro to grey out the text when
nothing is set up. And adding ‘registered’ makes the language consistent
through to the next page.
Previously we made surprising changed to the invited user as part
of the mock, and then surprising assertions that its ID matched
USER_ONE_ID. This simplifies the mock to do what it says, so that
we can test for the original ID of the existing user.*
*this does still differ from the ID of the sample_invite, which is
also hard-coded to USER_ONE_ID. However, this isn't relevant in
any of the tests, so doesn't seem to much of an issue.
This replaces the original fixture with a more explicit one, noting
that none of the tests rely on this fixture as part of testing the
scenarios when a user is already a member of the service.
This closes a security loophole, where the auth type of a Platform
Admin could be unwittingly changed when they accept an invite, or
by an admin of a service they are a member of.
when getting a list of security keys
Also test separately that we are correctly choosing key out of list
of security keys. Previously we have done it as a part
of testing pages where where we were calling API to get a list
of keys, but then choosing one of those keys based on id.
Also remove redundant second test credential after PR review
Also remove redundant return value from mocks in update name tests
When we are unable to delete security key because it's the last
one for that user, API throws an error. Here we catch that error
and display useful message to the user.
Use security key instead of webauthn credential
in user facing message - for consistency and readability.
We use security key term in user facing stuff and webauthn
credential in the code.
This makes the code shareable between:
- the broadcast tour pages
- the broadcast settings platform admin page
- the regular service navigation
On the training mode tour pages we don’t want to confuse people with the
organisation name or _Switch service_ links, so those are omitted and
the code is therefore slightly different.
This naming was introduced in 2016 without explanation [1]. I find it
confusing because:
- It's reminiscent of "_app", which is a Python convention indicating
the variable is internal, so maybe avoid using it.
- It suggests there's some other "app" fixture I should be using (there
isn't, though).
The Python style guide describes using an underscore suffix to avoid
clashes with inbuilt names [1], which is sort of applicable if we need
to import the "app" module [2]. However, we can also avoid clashes by
choosing a different name, without the strange underscore.
[1]: 3b1d521c10
[2]: 78824f54fd/tests/app/main/views/test_forgot_password.py (L5)
At the moment if you’re invited to a live broadcast service you get the
training mode tour. This is misleading, and could make people think they
weren’t in danger of sending a real alert.
This commit adds a short, 2 step tour for users invited to a live
broadcast service.
