Since we’ve introduced the ‘on behalf of’ wording to the go live ticket
(to talk about who the agreement has been signed on behalf of) it’s
confusing to use the same terminology to talk about the organisation
for whom the agreement has been accepted.
Previously this test asserted on `current_user.is_authenticated`. That
isn’t possible now because the object imported into tests isn’t the same
one the app is using.
A different proxy for whether the user is signed in is whether they have
a user id in their session, because we set this every time they sign in:
ff32e73d9b/app/models/user.py (L162)
This is the newest version.
Pyup is complaining about vulnerabilities in version 1.0.1, specifically
> Werkzeug version 2.0.2 improves the security of the debugger cookies.
> "SameSite" attribute is set to "Strict" instead of "None", and the
> secure flag is added when on HTTPS.
Previously we were using whatever version of Werkzeug that Flask
specified this pins it to get rid of the vulnerability without having to
upgrade everything at once.
This requires a few changes to tests which were relying on importing
`session` and `current_user` from Flask. Previously it seemed that
importing these in the tests referred to the same object that was being
used in the app. This appears to no longer be the case. This commit
works around that by:
- using a context manager to get the contents of the session, like we
already do in most tests
- asserting that the mock which logs the user in is being called with
the right values, rather than looking at the state of the
`current_user` object (which was probably giving false certainty
anyway)
In https://github.com/alphagov/notifications-admin/pull/3663/files we
made specific routes for sending the ‘tour’ text message, rather than
sharing the ‘one-off’ routes in `send.py`.
This commit moves the final route in the tour journey into `tour.py` as
well, which is where I expected to find it when I was looking for it
just now.
The feedback endpoints use `ticket_type` to decide what to display and
whether or not a ticket should be escalated. We were using the
ticket_type as the value for the Zendesk ticket_type. However, the Zendesk
API accepts 4 values for its ticket_type and these are different from
the ticket_type values we use in our code.
This change converts the Notify ticket_type value to a valid Zendesk
ticket_type value when creating a Notify feedback ticket.
The new way of creating support tickets can be seen in
[notifications-utils](https://github.com/alphagov/notifications-utils/pull/899).
This changes tickets created when making a request to go live to use
the new way, while other tickets stay the same for now.
The go live tags have been removed. Some of these had become
unneccessary since you can't make the request to go live unless they are
true (e.g. `notify_go_live_email_reply_to`). Others will always get
added by a Zendesk macro when the ticket is replied to, so we don't need
to add them here.
the api returns UTC timestamps, we should keep them as UTC timestamps
until the very last moment, and only convert them into BST when we know
we want to return to a user (ie: in contact-list.html and other places
like that)
since we are hard-coding a generic error message on the front-end, we
have no need to do anything on the back end. This is also nice as it
standardises the two flows to behave more like each other (rather than
previously where one would `flash` an error message and the other would
return CBOR for the js to decode).
Note that the register flow returns 400 while the auth flow returns 403.
The js for both just checks `response.ok` so will handle both. The JS
completely discards any body returned if the status isn't 200 now.
Add additional instructions for the service name - this is more consistent with the local government version of this page
Also update tests to use the new content.
The original code to raise the exception was flawed: if a broadcast
only had a single area that was invalid, we would assume it was a
custom broadcast [1]. Since the recent changes [2] fixed the flaw
we're now getting exceptions for broadcasts of this kind.
It's not practical to go and manually fix the invalid broadcasts,
and the likelihood is there will be more in future as the set of
areas we support changes. This takes a pragmatic approach of simply
logging the issue and pretending such broadcasts are custom.
[1]: 926ada2f21
[2]: https://github.com/alphagov/notifications-admin/pull/4014/files#diff-2dd8f77d6df281e7674b20263cdf27a3d58b839dc5930c0087ac8b9749b313e4R92
Previously we relied on the API defaulting this field to an empty
array [1], but that conflicts with using it to decide whether a
broadcast is custom or created in this app.
[1]: 3779146cc5/app/models.py (L2342)
Custom broadcasts created directly via the API app won't have area
IDs since [1], where we started to distinguish between "names" (all
broadcasts have these) and IDs (for broadcasts created in this app).
We forgot to propagate the distinction into the code here.
This code fixes the bug for all broadcasts created after [1]. Any
custom broadcasts created before [1] will have their "ids" field set
instead of "names" so we won't show anything for them. This seems
reasonable as we don't support custom broadcasts yet.
[1]: 023a06d5fb
The aggregate names don't need to be sorted, but it helps to do
this for the tests, since the implementation of sets may not be
stable between machines and lead to sporadic test failures.
I did also toy with sorting granular area names so they have a
similar ordering, but this would take them out-of-order with IDs
and really the important thing is that the ordering is stable.
This applies some heuristics to try and keep the overall list of
areas short when many are selected in the same wider area.
Currently we only have relationship information between upper and
lower tier local authorities, so we can't / won't aggregate up to
Greater London (it's own special thing) or whole countries.
Depends on: https://github.com/alphagov/notifications-api/pull/3314
Previously:
- We introduced a new "areas_2" API field that's can
populate the "areas" column in the same way.
- We updated the Admin app to use the new field, so that
the old "areas" and "simple_polygons" API fields are unused.
- We repurposed the unused "areas" API field to use
the new "areas_2" format.
This PR:
- We can switch the Admin app back to the "areas" field,
but in the new format.
Future PRs:
- Remove support for the unused "areas_2" field (migration complete)
These will be used as a fallback for display in gov.uk/alerts. It
also helps to have them in the DB to aid in quickly identifying
where an alert was sent, which is hard from the IDs.
We will look at backfilling names for past alerts in future work.
Resolves: https://github.com/alphagov/notifications-admin/pull/3980#discussion_r692919874
Previously it was unclear what kinds of areas this method returned,
and whether there would be any duplicates (due to the hierarchy of
areas we work with). This clarifies that.
In addition, the areas returned may not overlap with the custom one
[1], so we should reword to avoid falsely implying that. We could do
the overlap check as part of the method as an alternative, but that
would create extra work when calculating the ratio of intersection.
We could always add "overlapping areas" as a complementary method to
this one in future.
[1]: https://github.com/alphagov/notifications-admin/pull/3980#discussion_r692919874
Previously we were passing a flag to the API which handled this. Now
we are doing it at the time of clicking the link, not at the time of
storing the new password. We don’t need to update the timestamp twice,
so this commit removes the code which tells the API to do it.
Accepting an invite means that you’ve just clicked a link in your email
inbox. This shows that you have access to your email.
We can make a record of this, thereby extending the time before we ask
you to revalidate your email address.
When someone uses a fresh password reset link they have proved that they
have access to their inbox.
At the moment, when revalidating a user’s email address we wait until
after they’ve put in the 2FA code before updating the timestamp which
records when they last validated their email address[1].
We can’t think of a good reason that we need the extra assurance of a
valid 2FA code to assert that the user has access to their email –
they’ve done that just by clicking the link. When the user clicks the
link we already update their failed login count before they 2fa. Think
it makes sense to handle `email_access_validated_at` then too.
As a bonus, the functional tests never go as far as getting a 2FA code
after a password reset[2], so the functional test user never gets its
timestamp updated. This causes the functional tests start failing after
90 days. By moving the update to this point we ensure that the
functional tests will keep passing indefinitely.
1. This code in the API (91542ad33e/app/dao/users_dao.py (L131))
which is called by this code in the admin app (9ba37249a4/app/utils/login.py (L26))
2. 5837eb01dc/tests/functional/preview_and_dev/test_email_auth.py (L43-L46)
Theoretically the maximum expiry time of a broadcast should be 24 hours.
If it goes over 24 hours there can be problems.
However we want to make it more conservative to mitigate two potential
issues:
1. The CBC has a repetition period (eg 60 seconds) and a count (eg
1,440). If these were slightly innaccurate or generous it could take
us over 24 hours. For this reason we should give ourselves half an
hour of buffer.
2. It’s possibly that the CBC could interpret a UTC time as BST or vice
versa. Until we’re sure that it’s using UTC everywhere, we need to
remove another whole hour as buffer.
In total this means we remove 1 hour 30 minutes from 24 hours, giving an
expiry time of 22 hours 30 minutes.
While testing alerts on these channels the MNOs sometimes need to
restart their CBCs to make sure everything is failing over properly.
If the CBC does not come back up, for whatever reason, then we are left
in a state where the alert can’t be cancelled.
To minimise the impact to the public in this scenario we should keep the
expiry time at 4 hours for alerts sent on test channels. We recently
increased it back up to 24 hours for all channels, so this in effect is
reverting that change for channels that won’t be used in a real
emergency.
By using the simplified polygons instead of the full resolutions ones
we:
- query less data from SQLite
- pass less data around
- give Shapely a less complicated shape to do its calculations on
This makes it faster to calculate how much of each electoral ward a
custom area overlaps.
For the two areas in our tests:
Place represented by custom area | Before | After
---------------------------------|--------|--------
Bristol | 0.07s | 0.02s
Skye | 0.02s | 0.01s
