7 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
copilotcoder	e4b19c283c	Pin frontend Corepack Yarn version to 4.10.3	2026-07-15 10:15:24 -04:00
copilotcoder	ebcd48069a	Force-overwrite Yarn binary during frontend image build	2026-07-15 09:53:40 -04:00
copilotcoder	f08c160225	Use npm-distributed Yarn in frontend image build	2026-07-15 07:51:18 -04:00
copilotcoder	d5da31d352	Use vendored Yarn in frontend base build and harden BuildKit auth	2026-07-15 00:42:34 -04:00
Xlorep DarkHelm	f3698b095b	Stabilize self-hosted CI workflows and resolve issue #62 (#73) ... ## Summary Hardens CI workflows for self-hosted Gitea runners by stabilizing E2E execution and Renovate behavior across internal/external network paths. Closes #62 ## What Changed ### E2E workflow reliability - Fixed E2E workspace handoff to ensure expected repository contents are present during test execution. - Added stricter preflight checks for required frontend files before running E2E. - Reduced mount/path fragility while preserving runtime image pull and compose flow. ### Renovate workflow hardening - Added internal-first endpoint reachability selection with fallback handling. - Added token preflight checks for repository access. - Added explicit host-rule auth handling for API/git paths. - Added container-level connectivity preflight diagnostics. - Added git URL override aligned with selected endpoint context. - Removed incorrect forced Dogar host-IP pinning that broke HTTPS clone routing. ## Why CI behavior was sensitive to runner networking and Renovate clone/auth interactions. These changes make the workflow deterministic in our runner topology and address recurring CI failures. ## Scope - Workflow logic only (`cicd.yaml`, `renovate.yml`) - No app feature or API behavior changes ## Validation - Workflow YAML validation passed during updates. - Changes were applied and verified iteratively from real failing run diagnostics. Co-authored-by: copilotcoder <copilotcoder@darkhelm.org> Reviewed-on: #73	2026-07-13 11:16:16 -04:00
Xlorep DarkHelm	c7540e97ad	feat(ci): enforce runtime-validation image separation (#69) ... ## Summary Implements issue #59 by enforcing a hard boundary between CI validation tooling and deployable runtime images. This PR: - Adds automated deployable-runtime boundary checks in CI. - Verifies deployable backend/frontend artifacts are free of CI/development tooling. - Documents runtime-vs-validation ownership and enforcement behavior. ## What Changed ### CI workflow enforcement - Updated `.gitea/workflows/docker-build-main.yaml` to: - Checkout additional verification inputs (`Dockerfile.backend`, `Dockerfile.frontend`, scripts, backend/frontend directories). - Run `scripts/check-dockerfile-boundaries.sh`. - Build deployable runtime images (`Dockerfile.backend`, `Dockerfile.frontend --target production`). - Run `scripts/verify-deployable-image-purity.sh` against both images before publishing CICD image. - Updated `.gitea/workflows/cicd-checks.yaml` to add: - `dockerfile-boundary-check` job. - Boundary validation execution inside the CICD validation image. ### New enforcement scripts - Added `scripts/check-dockerfile-boundaries.sh`: - Ensures deployable Dockerfiles do **not** reference CICD image paths (`cicd-base`, `CICD_BASE_IMAGE`, `Dockerfile.cicd*`, etc.). - Ensures deployable Dockerfiles do **not** include disallowed CI-only tooling tokens. - Enforces runtime base expectations: - Backend: `python:3.14-slim` - Frontend production target: `nginx:alpine` - Added `scripts/verify-deployable-image-purity.sh`: - Baseline binary checks for disallowed tooling. - Backend-specific deep checks: - Python module import probes for disallowed CI/dev modules. - `pip show` package metadata checks for disallowed CI/dev packages. - Frontend-specific deep checks: - OS package metadata checks (`apk`/`dpkg` when available) for disallowed runtime leaks. - Directory-based checks for development package trees (`node_modules`, `.venv`, `site-packages`, `dist-packages` in sensitive paths). ## Documentation updates - Updated `docs/DEVELOPMENT.md`: - Clarifies runtime-vs-validation enforcement and where checks run. - Notes purity checks include binaries and metadata artifacts. - Updated `docs/CICD_MULTI_STAGE_BUILD.md`: - Adds explicit “Runtime Boundary Enforcement” section. - Documents metadata-level purity probes. - Updated `docs/DEPLOYABLE_RUNTIME_CONTRACT.md`: - Replaces future-only language with current enforcement hooks. - Documents binary + metadata-level purity enforcement. ## Acceptance Criteria Mapping 1. **Deployable backend/frontend image paths do not require CI-only tool installation** - Enforced by: - `scripts/check-dockerfile-boundaries.sh` - `scripts/verify-deployable-image-purity.sh` - `docker-build-main.yaml` pre-publish gates 2. **Checks and tests execute in dedicated validation environment(s)** - Reinforced by: - `cicd-checks.yaml` boundary-check job running in CICD validation image - Existing check/test workflow usage of CICD image 3. **Workflow docs identify runtime vs validation concerns** - Addressed via updates to: - `docs/DEVELOPMENT.md` - `docs/CICD_MULTI_STAGE_BUILD.md` - `docs/DEPLOYABLE_RUNTIME_CONTRACT.md` ## Scope / Non-Goals - Included: - Structural separation enforcement - Workflow-level guardrails - Documentation clarity and traceability - Not included: - Full staging deployment wiring - Security policy redesign ## Notes for Reviewers - Main enforcement path is in `docker-build-main.yaml` before CICD image publish. - New scripts are intentionally fail-fast and policy-oriented. - Existing deployable Dockerfiles currently satisfy the new gates. Co-authored-by: copilotcoder <copilotcoder@darkhelm.org> Reviewed-on: #69	2026-06-22 12:45:20 -04:00
Cliff Hill	9c4a8d96bc	Initial commit. ... Signed-off-by: Cliff Hill <xlorep@darkhelm.org>	2025-10-18 09:14:10 -04:00